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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 01/02/2008 Accident number: 497 
Accident time: 07:40 Accident Date: 09/07/2007 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 01/02/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
A UMACA letter about this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its 
conversion to a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The 
substance of the letter is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held 
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on record. The demining group’s internal investigation was made available in January 2008. It 
follows the UNMACA letter below. 
Text in [ ] is editorial.  
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY 
OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON [demining NGO] DEMINER ON JULY 09 ,2007 
AT QALAI GULAY VILLAGE OF BAGRAM 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
As a result of a demining accident on [the Victim], deminer of [demining NGO], DT-03 at 
07:40 hours on July 09, 2007 in task # AF/0308/01624/MF132 located at Qalai Gulay village, 
Bagram district of Parwan province, investigation team was convened by UNAMAC Kabul to 
conduct the investigation and find out the main causes of the accident.                                                                      
The accident caused serious injuries on face, eyes and right hand of the deminer. 
 
SUMMARY: 
Task# 132 is part of security belt of Bagram Regiment -40 which is contaminated by AP 
mines. Deminer [the Victim] using a hand trowel excavated onto an AP mine and caused it to 
detonate. As a result of this detonation he suffered minor injuries to his right hand and more 
serious to his face and both eyes with serious corneal defect to right eye, first degree burns to 
his face and ear damage. 
Following stabilization in the minefield, he was evacuated to Charikar hospital and 
subsequently moved by ambulance to eye hospital in Kabul.  
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The following points were found by investigation team: 
1. The two items of equipment (trowel and apron) both received blast/burn scorch marks 
as a result of the detonation, together with minor injuries to the deminer right hand 
and extensive peppering of the deminer face are consistent with the blast /burn 
effects experienced in many similar accidents. This directs the investigation team to 
conclude that the visor was not worn during the detonation of the mine. 
2. Further, the intense blast/burn scorch marks to the central base of the visor indicate 
that this area of the visor was in very close proximity to the seat of detonation. 
3. Additionally, in view of there being no blast/burn marks to the underside of the chin, 
or the exposed neck and no burning or singing of the beard, the team concludes that 
the visor was nor worn in the correct position or more probably that it was not worn at 
all. 
4. The proximate cause of the accident was the shaving procedure, independent of prior 
prodding with the hand trowel detonating the mine during this procedure. First, he 
should have been conducting prodding procedure with bayonet or prodder, followed 
by excavation procedure with the hand trowel. 
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5. A contributory cause of the accident was weak supervision by both team leader and 




The following points are to be considered: 
1. The team leader and section leader have been disciplined by [Demining NGO] 
management, and the investigation team concurs with the decision taken by 
[Demining NGO] management. 
2. Further retraining of [Demining NGO] team must be conducted and the training 
should be monitored by concerned AMAC. 
3. The team command group must strictly control the deminers to be dressed with PPE 
and their visors down.  
4. The team command group is to ensure that all demining tool and equipment are used 
properly that is why the team command group is [exists]. 
5. Since the task ground is hard and the task is dense contaminated area, it is 
recommended that a supporting MDU be provided for clearance of this task. 
 
Signed: Chief of Operations, UNMACA Kabul 
 
Demining group internal report 
INTERNAL INVESTIGATION REPORT, KABUL JULY 2007 
 
1.  Objectives 
The objectives with the current report are: 
To deliver the evidence to other staff within the organization. 
To draw the attention of other staff to 100% implementation of standards. 
 
2. General Information        
Team/Site description: MCT 03, Section 01, Central Region, Bagram, Minefield 132 
Location of accident: Bagram District, Division No: 40 Base of Russian army 
Date & Time: 09th July 2007 at 07:40 am    
 
3. Particulars of Injured Person 
Name: [Removed]  
Title: Deminer                                     
Date of birth: 1979 - 26 Years old                     
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Place of birth: Azraw-Luger                           
Blood group: A Rh + ve   
 
4. Cause of the Accident 
Antipersonnel PMN – mine during the demining work whilst excavating the land. 
 
5. Brief Description of the Injuries 
A.  Multiple erosive fragmental injuries on the face, frontal and 1st degree burns all over the 
face and frontal anterior view. 
B.  Erosive fragmental injuries on dorsal view on right hand lateral side. 
C.  Both eyes slightly injured and the right eye serious corneal defect. 
D.  A fragmental wound in right side of the face include the ear auricular and an injury on the 
right eyelid. 
E. Bruise injuries in chin and neck. 
 
6. Chronological Overview of the Accident 
Following describes the actions taken and the instructions given by the command staff directly 
after the accident: 
Accident happened at. 07:40   
Operation of MCT-03 stopped. 07:41 
Team leader, paramedic and one deminer got to the accident point. 07:42 
Paramedic started treating and doing the first aid to the injured. 07:42 
First aid was given at the Ambulance pick-up point for 15 min. 07:57 
Radio room at main office got the report of accident. 08:00 
Patient was loaded into Ambulance and stabilised for 5 min. 08:02 
UNMACA was informed by Senior Operations Manager. 08:20 
AMAC Central was informed by Senior Operations Manager. 08:25 
Ambulance reached Char-E-Kar hospital, re-irrigated and re-dressed. 08:30 
Patient was moved after initial inspection to Kabul Nur (eye) hospital. 08:45 
Patient arrived into Nur (eye) hospital in Kabul. 09:42 
Internal Accident Investigation unit reached the accident site. 10:20 
External Accident Investigation unit (UNMACA) reached the accident site. 11:00 
Internal Accident Investigation unit reached Nur hospital in Kabul. 12:50 
IMSMA Accident Report form was delivered to AMAC Central. 14:30 
 
7. Brief Description on How the Accident Happened 
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The minefield is 20 years old and located in a village next to the Bagram Airbase and used to 
form a part to an old Russian military compound - in the middle of this theatre. At the accident 
lane, there is a stream for water coming from North, and a protective wall parallel to the 
stream across in a one meter distance. The mine location was on the top of one side of the 
water stream, near to the protective wall, where there is a deep gap between the wall and one 
side of the stream. The position of the mine may have changed in time due to the rain and 
snow falls in winter time or it may have changed during the heavy fighting in the village when 
hundreds of projectiles and artillery shells hit the terrain containing the landmines. During the 
internal investigation unit inspection on the accident environment, the accident point and the 
explosion crater was discovered and measured. Information were received from the support 
staff including the team leader [Name removed] MCT-3 concluding the sequence of the 
actions of the deminer prior to the accident. 
For the deminer actions, see the summary at the end of the report. 
 
[The Victim’s PPE – clearly showing soot inside the visor.] 
 
[Accident site: crater lower left.] 
General Condition of the Injured Person: On 2nd priority, now admitted in Noor Eye 
hospital, his general condition according to the doctor was stable and prediction for recovery 
successful.  
Damaged Equipment: Visor; Fragmentation vest; Base stick; Trowel; Rope 
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9. Technical Evidence  
Within the immediate surroundings to the crater, there were numerous spots indicating the 
impact of artillery shelling, a Chinese 82mm recoilless projectile lying on the ground (0,5 m 
from the accident point), and a large amount of soil piled up in the explosion to the left side of 
the crater – indicating together with the injuries of the deminer and the damage to the 
property, that the mine was lying at an angle - not in horizontal position. 
 
10. Treatment 
Open the IV line  and fixed the IV canola. 
Given the IV Fluids (Ringer Lactate) 1000 ml. 
Irrigated the injured face, eye and all erosive wounds by Normal saline. 
Dressed and maintained his both eyes by the Normal saline and apply the poly fax ointment 
in his eyes. 
Applied Analgesic: Diclonat P 3ml/IM, Pentonil 1ml dilute 
Applied Antibiotic: Vial Pan Ampicillin 1gr/IM 
       
11. Summary 
The accident happened during demining activities during excavation drill by PMN 
antipersonnel mine, involving a possible change in the position of the PMN from the actual 
planting position. When the deminer was shaving soil from the right side of the 1 m clearance 
lane by small trowel, the tool hit the PMN causing it to explode. It is likely that the deminer 
used his tool in an incorrect way, however it is evident that the PMN was lying in an angle 
towards left. The casualty was admitted into Noor Eye hospital in Kabul, his is stable and his 
health condition was set on 2nd priority. 
 
12. Lessons Learnt 
A full day of refresher training shall be conducted immediately for all 6 + 3 (JMAS) demining 
teams. The training subjects shall be the demining drills with a special concentration on the 
use of PPE combination of visor and vest and shaving the soil by using the small trowel. 
 
13. Investigation Team 
Operations: [Name removed] 
Operations: [Name removed] 
Medical: Dr [Name removed] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 658 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 26 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: no 
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Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 





AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eye  
COMMENT: See Medical report. 
 
Medical report 
[From Ops Manager to AMAC Manager, dated day of accident.] 
Description of injuries: Explosive fragmental injuries and 1st degree burns in face/ minor 
erosive fragmental injuries to right hand lateral side. 
Treatments given: Opened IV line – fixed TH IV Canola, given IV fluids (ringer lactate 
1000ml); irrigated the face, eye and erosive wound by saline 
[From the inquiry report.] 
Open the IV line  and fixed the IV canola. 
Given the IV Fluids (Ringer Lactate) 1000 ml. 
Irrigated the injured face, eye and all erosive wounds by Normal saline. 
Dressed and maintained his both eyes by the Normal saline and apply the poly fax ointment 
in his eyes. 
Applied Analgesic: Diclonat P 3ml/IM, Pentonil 1ml dilute 
Applied Antibiotic: Vial Pan Ampicillin 1gr/IM 
 
Description of injuries 
A.  Multiple erosive fragmental injuries on the face, frontal and 1st degree burns all over the 
face and frontal anterior view. 
B.  Erosive fragmental injuries on dorsal view on right hand lateral side. 
C.  Both eyes slightly injured and the right eye serious corneal defect. 




[The picture has been distorted to protect identity.] 
E. Bruise injuries in chin and neck. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the 
investigators determined that the Victim was not wearing his visor in the down position at the 
time of the accident. Not only was this error not corrected, it is implied that the visor was 
deliberately damaged after the event in order to give a false impression that it was being worn 
at the time. 
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because the investigators determined 
that the deminer was not conducting the excavation in the correct way and recommended re-
training. 
The internal investigation provides a detailed timeline and good medical data but fails to 
address many of the concerns of the National Authority investigators. This raises questions 
about the level of cooperation between the demining group and the National Authority. The 
external investigators may have been over-critical, but the internal investigation shied away 
from making any critical conclusions that would require change. 
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